I. Introduction
The lessening of bank regulations in the early 1980s, the dramatic increase in depository institution failures in the middle and late 1980s, and the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) have heightened interest in depository institution insolvency risk and in the policy means to control this risk.
One regulatory reform that preceded FlRREA was the international risk-based capital accord, which was adopted by bank regulatory agencies from 12 industrialized nations in 1988. The guidelines mandate that U.S. banks be in full compliance by December 1992. Similar guidelines are currently being implemented for U.S. thrift institutions.
Risk-based capital (RBC) replaces capital guidelines that have required U.S. banks to hold a flat minimum percentage of capital against all assets since 1981. The risk-based standards, in contrast, require that different minimum capital percentages be held against different categories of assets according to their perceived risks. The new standards also require for the f i t time that capital be held against off-balance sheet activities. Another change is that the standards are largely uniform across all banks that operate internationally within the 12 participating nations.
RBC should be viewed not in isolation, but as part of an overall reform of the deposit insurance system, the primary goal of which is to reduce the incentives to undertake excessive risks that are inherent in the current flat-rate insurance regime. As will be shown below, RBC is a potential substitute for or complement to the risk discipline imposed by risk-based deposit insurance (RBDI) premia. In addition, the ability of RBC standards to reduce risk taking is related to the choice of accounting system (market value versus book value of capital), and can help to determine the effectiveness of bank examinations and policies to resolve problem institutions.
As with any capital standard, RBC is a form of coinsurance designed to reduce the costs of insolvency risk imposed on the federal deposit insurer by requiring a "buffer" of uninsured private funds to absorb portfolio losses. The major innovation of RBC is the requirement that more capital be held against portfolio items with higher perceived risk in order to provide incentives for banks to choose lower portfolio risk. This may be seen as implicit pricing of risk, since capital is a relatively costly source of funds, particularly when compared to insured deposits.
In large part, the success of RBC depends upon the extent to which the relative risk weights assigned to different portfolio categories correspond with the actual risks involved.
If the correspondence is relatively tight, then the combination of the "buffer" value of the increase in capital and the incentives provided by the implicit pricing of portfolio risk is likely to be successful in reducing insolvency risk. However, if the correspondence between the risk weights and actual risks is relatively loose, or if there are siWcant areas in which higher risk categories receive lower risk weights, then some banks may have compelling incentives to increase portfolio risk, thereby possibly raising their insolvency risk.
To date, there has been little empirical analysis addressing this question of how the risk weights correspond to actual bank risk or examining the major features of RBC in order to deter-1 mine their likely effects. This paper attempts to f i l l these gaps. We regress historical measures of bank performance, such as portfolio losses and bank failures, on the items in the RBC risk categories and test the appropriateness of the relative weights assigned. We also compare the ability of various measures of capital, including both the new and the old capital standards, to predict future bank performance. In addition, we examine the stringency of the new standards to determine whether they are likely to be effective in changing bank behavior.
The paper unfolds as follows. Sections I1 and III put the paper in perspective by reviewing the extant literature on capital standards and by comparing the relative advantages of RBC and RBDI, respectively. Section IV provides the empirical analysis in which measures of bank performance are regressed against RBC risk categories and subcategories in order to examine the efficacy of the RBC risk weights. Section V examines the stringency of the RBC standards by applying the 1992 standards to banks as of December 1989. The effects of changing the standards in various ways and the results of likely changes in bank portfolios are also calculated. Section VI concludes.
Literature Review
The extant literature on bank capital standards has 1) detailed their development and current specifications (e.g., Alfriend, 1988; Wall, 1989a) , 2) analyzed their stringency and whether they were binding (e.g., Keeley, 1988; Keeton, 1989; Wall and Peterson, 1987), 3) examined the relative competitive effects of RBC across countries (e.g., Cooper, Kolari, and Wagster, 1990) , 4) examined the extent to which one type of required capital, subordinated debt, imposes market discipline on banks (e.g., Avery, Belton, and Goldberg, 1988; Gorton and Santomero, 1990; Wall, 1989b) , 5) examined how RBC might affect the supply of bank services (e.g., Haley, 1989) , 6) examined how RBC might substitute for risk-based deposit insurance (e.g., Avery and Belton, 1987; Flannery, 1990; Ronn and Verma, 1988,1986) , and 7) derived on a theoretical basis the circumstances under which capital requirements may increase or decrease bank portfolio or insolvency risk (e.g., Kim and Santomero, 1988; Koehn ' . and Santomero, 1980; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Keeton, 1988) .
The most important question corning out of this literature is that of item (7)--whether increased capital standards increase or decrease bank risk. Virtually all authors agree that a mandatory increase in capital has the direct effect of reducing insolvency risk by providing an increased "buffer stock of reserve funds to absorb losses. However, portfolio changes may also be induced, creating indirect effects on insolvency risk. Most authors also agree that when capital is below some sufficiently low level (perhaps negative), this indirect effect will also reduce insolvency risk, as the mandatory capital increase induces a reduction in portfolio risk by mitigating the moral hazard incentives to undertake excessive risk. However, authors sharply disagree upon whether banks in typical financial conditions will generally increase or decrease portfolio and insolvency risks as a result of increased capital requirements. Kim and Santomero (1988) and Koehn and Santomero (1980) , using a mean-variance utility maximization model, showed that an increase in flat-rate capital requirements restricts the risk-return tradeoff somewhat, but that banks might still choose higher-risk portfolios as a result of increased capital standards as they maximize utility along a restricted risk-return frontier. This occurs because banks may choose to take part of their reduction in utility from the loss in leverage as increased risk as well as lower expected return. It is even possible that insolvency risk may increase as a result of an increase in capital standards, defeating the purpose of the increase.
Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) followed a different approach, examining the case of a bank with publicly traded stock that maximizes the value of that stock. They found that such a bank will never increase portfolio risk, ceteris paribus, as a result of increased capital standards. This stands in direct contrast to the results of the meanvariance utility maximization model. A key feature of the Furlong and Keeley analysis is that under flat-rate deposit insurance, an increase in capital makes the bank take into account more of its prospective portfolio losses. In more technical tenns, the capital increase reduces the value of the deposit insurance put option, the value of the bank's option to put part of its portfolio to the insurer in the event of failure and have the insurer repay its insured depositors in full. Furlong and Keeley objected to the mean-variance model because it assumed away the possibility of bank failure and changes in the value of the put option. However, Keeton (1988) showed that an increase in portfolio risk is quite possible as a result of increased capital standards, using a more general utility maximization model that includes the put option value. H i s analysis does not address the more important policy question of whether this increase in portfolio risk can be sufficient to offset the effect of increased capital in reducing bank insolvency risk. To our knowledge, no theory or example that includes the influence of the deposit insurance put option has yet been offered showing conditions under which increased capital requirements will result in increased bank insolvency risk.
Although the theoretical debate is ongoing, little has emerged from this literature to suggest that widespread increases in insolvency risk will occur as a result of increases in capital requirements. Insolvency risk increases do not occur in the stock value maximization model, www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm and no studies have shown that such increases can occur in a utility maximization model that 2 incorporates the put option value.
m.
Over the past several years, RBC and RBDI have been among the most prominently discussed methods of controlling bank risk, largely because they provide incentives for banks to reduce risk, rather than requiring direct intervention on the part of the insurer. Theoretically, either policy can reduce insolvency risk to virtually any level by placing sufficiently stiff penalties on risk through mandated increases in capital or insurance premia. Thus, as is well known, the same level of insolvency risk can be achieved by a well-implemented version of either policy (see Hannery, 1990; Ronn and V e m , 1988; Avery and Belton, 1987; Sharpe, 1978) . Despite this equivalence, a number of important differences exist between RBC and RBDI, especially when problems arise in setting the correct prices for either. We fmt examine the relative advantages of these policies when there are no pricing dficulties, and then discuss how these advantages change when somehportant pricing problems are introduced.
We assume throughout that the costs of raising capital are positively but imperfectly related to a bank's insolvency risk. For banks with traded stock, the imperfect relationship arises because of differential transactions costs in underwriting new issues, the loss of the deposit insurance subsidy, and, under the capital asset pricing model, the fact that the market only prices the part of risk that is correlated with the market portfolio. For small banks that do not trade, additional wedges in the relationship between risk and the cost of capital are created by problems such as a lack of diversification (which may induce considerable risk aversion), wealth constraints, and possible dilution of ownership and control.
A pure RBDI regime with no capital requirements would allow banks to choose both their portfolio risks and capital positions, and pay for the marginal social costs of the resulting insolvency risks. These social costs include not only the value of the deposit insurance put option, but also any other social costs arising from bank risk internalized by the insurer, such as expected costs of liquidating failed banks, additional monitoring, and increased potential for financial instability. In the resulting equilibrium, banks with relatively high costs of capital or relatively good risky investment opportunities (i.e., a comparative advantage in high expected returnlhigh risk portfolios), ceteris paribus, would tend to have higher insolvency risk and pay for this higher risk through greater insurance prernia. To some degree, RBDI corrects the capital market's imperfect pricing of risk by allowing banks to trade off portfolio risk and capital at the socially appropriate relative price.
RBDI pricing can also incorporate social costs other than those created by bank insolvency risk. For instance, Flannery (1990) argued that high capital ratios resulting from either RBDI or RBC may reduce the intermediation of bank deposits into bank assets, which in turn may reduce some positive externalities from the intermediation process. In this event, optimal RBDI pricing would determine the optimal mix between insolvency risk and intermediation by setting a premium schedule that penalizes insolvency risk from high portfolio risk more than insolvency risk fiom low capital.
A pure RBC regime with flat-rate deposit insurance would have fewer degrees of freedom than pure RBDI to achieve a social optimum. Under RBC, banks are allowed to choose their portfolio risks directly, but not their capital positions or insolvency risks.
Instead of explicitly pricing the social costs of insolvency risk, RBC implicitly prices portfolio risk by setting minimum capital requirements such that if the minimum is held, the marginal social costs of insolvency risk for each bank equal the flat-rate deposit insurance premium. Like pure RBDI, pure RBC can incorporate social costs other than those created by bank insolvency risk, including the loss of positive externalities fiom intermediation when capital is increased.
Under these conditions, pure RBDI, which explicitly prices both capital and portfolio risks, dominates pure RBC, which implicitly prices only portfolio risks. RBC creates a potential efficiency loss relative to RBDI, since the banks with the best risky portfolio opportunities and those with the lowest cost of capital may not be able to exploit their comparative advantages as well under RBC. This is because under pure RBDI a bank can trade off its portfolio risk and its capital position at the socially appropriate relative price, which is incorporated in the insurance premium schedule. In contrast, under pure RBC, banks must trade off between portfolio risk and capital at the relative price available to the bank in the market. This price may differ from the social optimum because of capital market imperfections, or because it does not incorporate the external social costs of risk or other factors.
Another problem with RBC is that some banks may choose to hold more than the mi ni mum required capital, so that the implicit pricing of risk through capital requirements has no effect on the marginal decisions of these banks. Thus, pure RBC can be as effective as pure RBDI in achieving a social optimum only if 1) the imperfections in the relationship between the cost of capital and bank risk are negligible, 2) the externalities from bank risk are negligible, and 3) no banks choose to hold capital in excess of the mi ni mum requirements. Conditions (1) and (2) ensure that the bank can trade off portfolio risk and capital at the socially appropriate rate in the market, and condition (3) ensures that RBC can affect their marginal tradeoff at
all.3
Thus, when there are no difficulties in setting RBDI or RBC prices, pure RBDI with no capital requirements dominates RBC in the sense that RBDI can price any risk or other social cost at least as efficiently as RBC or any combination of RBDI and RBC. However, as shown below, a role for RBC appears as soon as pricing problems are introduced. We consider two such problems here: asymmetric infomation and policy inflexibility.
We fmt relax the assumption of symmetric information. The insurer is generally at a signifcant information disadvantage relative to a bank in regard to its portfolio risk, since a ' principal reason for the existence of banks is to garner private information about the risk of its borrowers (see Diamond, 1984; Leland and Pyle, 1977) . Bank examiners check the paperwork on only a sample of the assets and off-balance sheet contracts in the portfolio (see Udell, 1989) , and even for these items, banks still may know their contractual counterparties 5 and their own portfolio risk significantly better than the insurer does.
Asymmetric information opens the possibility for a productive role for RBC as a substitute for or complement to RBDI for several reasons. First, capital requirements may be viewed as a form of forced coinsurance. When a bank experiences portfolio losses, the owners bear the first tranche of losses, while the insurer bears part of one of the following 6 tranches. To the extent that bank owners have better information on risk than does the insurer, capital standards improve the informational efficiency of (implicit) risk pricing, as the shadow price of risk provided by capital tends to give more accurate signals to reduce risk.
A second, related reason why RBC may be productive is that asymmetric information may exacerbate a moral hazard problem because the insurer cannot price any risk that it does not observe. By raising capital ratios for the least capitalized banks (which tend to have the greatest such moral hazard incentives), RBC may mitigate the problem by reducing the insurer's share of the cost of the bank's risk.' 4. It is assumed here that tbe only impomt informational asymmetry is between a bank and the insurer. If tbere are also important asymmetries between tbe bank a d capital mar)ret participants, tben an advaotage of RBDI over RBC is that it allows tbe bank to signal its risk assessment to tbe market using its leverage ratio (see Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Leland and Pyle, 1977) .
5. Some have argued that tbere is also substantial irdepeodent uncertainty about tbe value of capital as well as about tbe value of tbe portfolio (e.g., Fhnnery, 1990) , although these two values are obviously closely related.
6. 'Ibe exact tranche of losses borne by tbe i m m r depends upon state depositor preference laws, tbe implementation of bridge bank legislation, and tbe closure and purchase and assumption policies of tbe insurer.
7.
Note that while RBC results in higber capital than RBDI for the least capitalized banks, eitber policy may result in more capital for tbe banking system as a whole. This follows from the fact that RBDI may reward banks for acty increases in capital, while RBC does not reward capital increases above tbe minimum standards.
Third, by raising capital ratios for the least capitalized banks, RBC may allow the insurer to gain more information about portfolio risk. For any given portfolio risk, the bank will take longer to fail if capital is higher. During this time, the fluctuations in capital from observed portfolio gains and losses or the results of on-site examinations may reveal information that allows the insurer to improve its estimate of portfolio risk and change the explicit or implicit price charged for risk. Under pure RBDI, a bank with very low capital may fail before much valuable information from this ex post monitoring is gamered.
Finally, asymmetric information provides a reason why RBC may complement RBDI.
Flannery (1990) showed that when portfolio risk is imperfectly observed, there is error in estimating the put option value to use in pricing RBDI, and this error is decreasing in the capital ratio of the bank. RBC increases capital for the least capitalized banks with the most severe rnispricing problems, which may reduce RBDI pricing errors and result in a better distribution of insurance prernia and incentives.
We next relax the assumption that the insurer is completely flexible in responding to changes in bank insolvency risk. At best, RBDI premia and RBC requirements are set with a 8 lag determined by reporting or examination intervals. In addition, government agencies often must follow strict rules that attach certain premia or capital requirements to objective reported criteria, such as balance sheet or income statement ratios, rather than using all the information learned through examination or market prices. These inflexibilities lend some relative advantages to both RBDI and RBC.
In t e r n of explicit flexibility, RBDI has an advantage over RBC in that it has a shorter implementation lag. Banks can usually be made to pay a revised premium very quickly, whereas it may take considerable time to get new capital underwritten and sold to meet increased capital requirements. The difference is related to 1) the long and diEcult process of 8. Sagari and Udell(1990) proposed reducing tbe effect of examination lags by letting banks &tennine their own RBDI premia and tben checking on tbe accufacy of these p~m i a through retrospective examinations. Ex post penalties are imposed when tbe premia were too low for a previous period. ' Ibis procedure could apply as well to RBC.
raising new capital and 2) the fact that the sheer number of dollars that must be raised for an 9 increase in RBC capital is much greater than the corresponding RBDI premium increase.
In terms of implicit flexibility, by contrast, RBC may have an important advantage over RBDI for the least capitalized banks. Although the insurer may be bound by rules that do not allow responses to some publicly available information, market participants are not. An increase in insolvency risk that is publicly known will result in some market discipline through higher costs for raising equity capital and uninsured debt. The greater is the amount of these uninsured funding sources, the greater is the market discipline that automatically penalizes banks for increasing insolvency risk. RBC has more implicit flexibility than RBDI in pricing risk for banks with very low capital, since RBC requires these banks to hold more capital, and the market pricing of this capital will reflect observed risk without the necessity of rules.
Although new equity capital is issued only infrequently, an equity standard implicitly prices risk continuously to the extent that the equity holders have control over management.
The analysis presented here suggests that pure RBDI is superior to pure RBC in terms of allocative efficiency when there are no information or policy implementation problems that create pricing errors. However, the best policy when these problems do occur may be neither pure RBDI nor pure RBC, but a combination of the two.
W . Empirical Analvsis of the Risk-Based Capital Standards
The new RBC standards represent a significant change from past capital guidelines.
Under the old standards effective since 1981, all banks were subject to the same minimum capital/asset ratios, irrespective of risk. Primary capital (equity, loan loss reserves, and some convertible debt and preferred stock) had to be at least 5.5 percent of total balance sheet assets, and total capital (primary capital plus subordinated debt and the remaining preferred stock) had to be at least 6 percent of assets. Under the new standards, by contrast, required capital ratios depend upon the perceived risk of the various assets and off-balance sheet activities. Regulators have considered two methods of introducing risk into capital standards or deposit insurance premia. The method followed by the FDIC in its 1985 RBDI proposal (see Hirschhom, 1986) focused on measures of current bank portfolio performance, such as e mings and asset quality. The new RBC standards, in contrast, focus on the current types of 1 0 activities in bank portfolios.
This approach is based on the view that some activities are inherently more risky than others and therefore should be capitalized at higher levels. Under the new standards, on-balance sheet assets a~ allotted to one of four categories (A1 -A4) and each category is assigned a different relative risk weight, ranging from 0 to 100 percent (as shown in Table 1 ). Off-balance sheet activities also have a number of separate treatments.
We weight them using the RBC relative weights and group them under two categories--counterparty guarantees (B I), where the bank guarantees the creditworthiness of another party (e.g., commitments, letters of credit), and market risk contracts (B2), where risk is principally determined by changes in market prices (e.g., interest rate swaps). The minimum capital level, K, required under the standards is then defined as:
where a is .04 for Tier 1 capital and .08 for total Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital, and B 1 and B2
incorporate the weights of their components. Tier 2 capital is restricted to be no larger than Tier 1 capital, which implies that all banks that fail the Tier 1 standard also fail the total standard (but not vice versa). A feature of the old capital standards is retained in a leverage requirement that Tier 1 capital must be at least 3 percent of (unweighted) on-balance sheet assets, although the actual requirement will be higher for some banks.' ' 10. One exception is the new treatment of loan loss reserves as qualifying capital (see section V). 1 1. At the time of this writing, the W e d Reserve and OCC have recently implemented similar leverage policies that mandate minimum 3 percent Tier 1 capital to unweighted assets ratios for banks with the best examination rating (composite CAMEL = 1) that meet certain otber conditions, with at least 1 to 2 percent additional capital for all otber banks. The FDIC appears likely to implement a similar policy of 3 percent minimum for banks with the best rating that meet otber conditions, with at least a 4 percent minimum for otber banks.
Critics have charged that the risk weights were somewhat arbitrarily chosen (e.g., the weighting of real estate loans at 50 percent rather than 100 percent) and may not necessarily reflect the true risks inherent in these different activities. In addition, the risk categories are very broad and may include items with quite different risks, particularly the 100 percent asset category which groups commercial loans of a l l qualities together. Moreover, the covariances among risks are not directly included, so in some circumstances, speculative portfolios may have the same capital requirements as hedged ones.
Despite these criticisms, however, if the higher weighted assets tend to have higher risk and if the off-balance sheet activities included create substantial risk, then the risk weights likely go significantly beyond the old flat-rate standards in identifying bank risk. It is also possible that even if the individual portfolio items do not cause risks in proportion to their risk weights, they are correlated with risks reasonably well in proportion to their weights.
This would occur, for example, if banks with high percentages of Treasury securities or other zero-weight (Al) assets tend to have relatively low risk in their commercial loan portfolios or in their other full-weight (A4) assets.
It is clear that the efficacy of the risk weights is an empirical question, although to date there has been very little empirical analysis attempting to relate the RBC risk weights to actual bank risk. In this section, we examine this issue through the use of historical data on bank performance. We focus on the question of whether those assets assigned lower risk weights are associated with relatively "better" historical bank performance than those with higher weights. We also examine how failure to meet the RBC standards compares with failure to meet the old standards in predicting poor bank performance; that is, do the new standards truly take better account of risk differences across banks?
The ideal data set for this analysis would include information on the performance of individual loans, off-balance sheet contracts, and other portfolio items. Unfortunately, a comprehensive data set of this type is not available. As the best feasible alternative, we analyze the problem at the individual bank level, making a number of comparisons. Measures of the current performance of a bank--the rate of nonperforming loans (past due and nonaccruing), the net loan charge-off rate, the earnings rate (in level and standard deviation), and failure (bankruptcy)--are regressed against the lagged shares of bank assets and off-balance sheet items in each risk weight class. These regressions are designed to determine whether the weighting of assets under the new standards is consistent with the bank performance that is historically associated with these assets. We also run regressions to determine how failures to meet the new and old capital standards are associated with future bank performance.
Because the choice among bank performance measures is somewhat arbitrary, we include five different measures. Bank failure is the ultimate determinant of performance and is arguably the most appropriate measure to use in testing capital standards. Only in the event of bank failure does the insurer take a loss and are significant social costs generated.
Moreover, some types of risk cannot be measured directly (e.g., propensity for fraud), but these are at least captured somewhat by the probability of failure. Each of the other measures captures one aspect of bank performance. Nonperforming loans is a stock measure reflecting the cumulative additions of poor loans. Charge-offs and earnings levels are flow measures, which may be more indicative of a bank's current performance. Earnings variability (standard deviation) reflects a longer-run view. While these are not exhaustive measures of performance, they should provide a reasonably broad-based test of the issues cited above.
Our analysis is based on Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) data measured annually on December 3 1 for the period 1982 to 1989. We divide banks into two different samples for the analysis. The "small bank" sample consists of those with total adjusted assets (gross assets plus loan loss reserves) of less than $250 million (in 1989 dollars) during the entire sample period. Any period in which the bank had real adjusted assets of less than $10 million was eliminated, as were any periods in which primary capital was more than one-half 1 2 of total assets. The "large bank" sample consists of banks with real adjusted assets of more than $250 million in at least one year. Together, the samples include data on virtually all 12. Very small banks and very highly capitalized banks often operate as specializing or shell banks that are atypical of bank behavior and therefore were excluded. In terms of total idustry assets, these exclusions are trivial.
U.S. commercial banks of significant size in existence during the past eight years. The decision to split the sample stemmed fiom strong historical evidence that risk and performance differ substantially across bank size classes.
The definition and sample means of the variables used are presented in Table 2 . Each variable is scaled to ratio form by dividing by total adjusted bank assets. The INCOME, NONPERFORM, and CHARGEOFF performance variables are measured for each period fiom December 1983 through December 1989. If a bank failed in the year preceding a measurement date, it is excluded from the NONPERFORM and CHARGEOFF regressions. INCOME, however, is estimated in these cases and is the negative of existing capital at the end of the previous year minus the FDIC's estimated net outlay for the bank (taken from . Overall, these procedures produced small and large bank sample sizes of 82,23 1 and 9,675 bank-years for the income and bank failure regressions; 8 1,457 small and 9,597 large bank-years for the nonperforming loan and charge-off regressions; and 13,169 small and 1,528 large bank cross-sectional observations for the income variability models. (the sum of the REALEST and RWA50 coefficients) implies that such loans should be weighted less heavily rather than more heavily. Indeed, by even wider margins, other assets in the 50 percent category standards (primarily municipal bonds) appear to be weighted too heavily as well. Second, evidence that we report elsewhere (Avery and Berger, 1988,1991) showing that loan commitments are associated with better rather than poorer bank performance is supported by all 10 regressions in which COMMIT appears. In both samples, increased proportions of loan commitments (reflected by the sum of the coefficients of COMMIT and COUNTER) are associated with higher income, lower income variability, and fewer nonperfomzing loans, charge-offs, and failures. Note that this does not imply that risk is lowered by commitments, ceteris paribus, but rather that commitments are a signal of quality because better performing banks tend to issue more commitments. Interestingly, this better performance result also holds for other counterparty off-balance sheet items standards (primarily standby letters of credit), but only for large banks. For the small bank sample, these items appear to be positively associated with risk, although the RBC risk weight still 
Explicit account of interest rate risk is under coosideration for future versions of RBC.
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm (particularly swaps). However, the fmdings may be unreliable for this variable because 1) the coefficients for the large banks are mainly statistically insignificant and 2) the coefficients for the small banks may be overly influenced by a few observations, since the vast majority of small banks have little or no contracts of this type (see Table 2 ).
No inferences about the appropriateness of the zero percent risk category (primarily cash and government securities) can be made from the regressions in Table 3 , because these regressions test relative rather than absolute weights. A separate set of regressions (not displayed) was run to test the zero restriction. These regressions were similar to those in Table 3 , except that the zero category was added and levels of the variables were used rather than ratios (ratios would create perfect collinearity). In general, the results support the zero restriction. Indeed, in all but 2 of 10 cases, negative weights for the zero percent category could be indicated because higher levels of zero category assets were associated with better bank performance. The two exceptions (large bank income and failure) were statistically insignificant. average loan problems in the future.
The second set of regressions presented in Table 4 sheds light on the relative predictive power of the three requirements of the new standard: Tier 1, total capital, and leverage. The data generally show that failing any of the three requirements indicates poorer performance.
Of the 30 coefficients of FAILTI, FAILTOT, and FAILLEV, 28 are of the expected sign, although many of the coefficients are not statistically significant because of the strong collinearity.2 Turning to specifics, the data show that failing the Tier 1 standard predicts more pronounced future performance problems than failing the leverage requirement. The data also suggest that banks that fail the total capital standard but pass the Tier 1 standard are likely to perform better than those failing both standards and worse than those passing both standards. This is particularly true for small banks. Thus, the inclusion of Tier 2 capital in the RBC requirements appears to add important infomation.
The SHORTFALL variable, which measures the degree to which capital standards are violated, is included in order to f o m a crude test of "prompt resolution." Under prompt resolution policies, successively greater penalties (including closure) are applied to banks as they fall further below capital minimums. The data lend strong support to prompt resolution, with all 10 SHORTFALL coefficients indicating poorer future perfomance the greater is the degree to which the standards are violated (9 are statistically significant). The EXCESS variable, which measures the degree to which the capital standards are exceeded, provides a crude test of whether it may be appropriate to reward banks for holding capital beyond the minimum requirements through a reduced RBDI premium or other method. The results Results presented in this section are quite robust to a number of variations that are not displayed. These include dropping the risk subcategories from the regressions in Tables 3   and 4 , varying the time periods, adding dummies for size classes, adding independent variables lagged two years, and adjusting the performance measures in various ways, such as making the FAILURE variable cover one year instead of two. In no case did these variations substantively alter the basic conclusions.
Note that all tbe regressions reported in

V. The Strin~ency of the Risk-Based Capital Standards
Whether the new RBC standards are likely to be effective in changing bank behavior depends both upon the implicit relative capital prices that they impose (analyzed in the previous section), and upon the extent to which the new standards are more or less stringent than the old standards on individual banks (i.e., the change in absolute capital prices). sheet and off-balance sheet activities account for the greatest burdens in terms of riskweighted assets and calculate the effects of some changes in portfolio behavior. Table 6 shows the banks that fail to meet the new and old capital standards and each of the three components of the new standards, based on 1989 data. For a given size class of banks, each cell shows the proportion of banks that fail to meet the standards, the percent of the size class' assets represented by these banks, and the gross amount of capital by which these banks are deficient.
Comparison of the new and old standards in columns (I), (2), and (3) yields two major conclusions. First, the new standards will put pressure on a significantly different set of banks than the old standards, shifting the burden of capital requirements substantially onto larger banks. Institutions that failed the RBC standards in 1989 comprised 27.7 percent of all bank assets and were nearly eight times as large as those that passed, with nearly half of the banks in the largest size class (more than $10 billion in assets) failing. By contrast, banks that failed the old standards comprised only 3.6 percent of all assets and were slightly smaller on average than those that passed. The contrast between the new and old standards with respect to bank size is also highlighted by the data shown in column (3) www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
The second major conclusion is that the new standards appear to be more stringent than the old ones. Five hundred ninety-one banks failed the new standards, 22 percent more than the 484 that failed the old standards. In addition, the capital deficiency under the new standards was $15.1 billion, more than six times the $2.4 billion under the old standards. Despite these relatively large differences, however, it is not clear whether in the aggregate the new standards will be very difficult to meet. The $15.1 billion aggregate capital deficit represents only 6 percent of the $256 billion of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital held by the industry in 1989. For banks in the largest size class, which accounted for $10.8 billion of the total deficiency, this represents 11 percent of their $96 billion in capital. Note that the costs of compliance will be somewhat lower than the costs of raising these amounts of capital because of the flexibility of the RBC standards. In some cases, the cost of making portfolio adjustments to reduce required capital--such as substituting lower risk category assets for higher risk category assets, selling assets, or reducing off-balance sheet activities--will be less than the cost of raising additional 2 2 capital.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) show the banks that failed to meet the three components of the new RBC requirements: Tier 1, total capital, and leverage. The total standard is clearly more binding than the Tier 1 standard, with 585 banks (representing 27.7 percent of all bank assets) having failed the total standard and only 259 banks (representing 5.2 percent of all bank assets) having failed the Tier 1 standard. Part of this dominance of the total standard is by construction, since banks that fail the Tier 1 standard must also fail the total standard.
However, much of this result is also due to the fact that the old standards placed very little emphasis on the types of capital in Tier 2. In 1989, total Tier 1 capital was $200 billion, while Tier 2 was only $56 billion. Moreover, $30 billion of the $56 billion in Tier 2 capital was loan loss reserves, which counted as primary capital under the old standards.
22. Note also tbat because of some of tbe RBC capital restrictions, the capital deficiency is not always the amount that must be raised to meet tbe standards. For instance, if a bank is bound by the restriction that Tier 2 be no greater than Tier 1, a marginal $1 raised of Tier 1 capital reduces the capital deficiency by $2, and a marginal $1 raised of Tier 2 capital leaves tbe capital deficiency unchanged.
Column (6) shows the effect of a leverage requirement that banks hold Tier 1 capital of at least 3 percent of their unweighted total assets. This requirement appears to be very similar to the Tier 1 requirement, which requires the same type of capital. The main difference is that the leverage requirement falls less hard on the largest banks, since it neglects off-balance sheet items. However, the noteworthy fact is that the leverage requirement as applied here adds virtually nothing to the risk-based requirements. Only six small banks failed the leverage requirement that did not fail the risk-based requirements, making column (5) nearly identical to column (1).
Much discussion has focused on the levels of the Tier 1 and total capital requirements. Table 7 shows the effects of raising these standards on the various size classes of banks.
Column (1) shows the new standards applied to 1989 data, and the succeeding columns report the effects of increasing the Tier 1 and total standards by 1,2,3, and 4 percent. Column (2) shows that increasing the standards to 5 percent for Tier 1 and to 9 percent for total capital virtually doubles the number of banks that would have failed to meet the standards for all size classes except the largest one and the smallest two. However, the aggregate total capital deficit rises only to $26 billion, or about 10 percent of 1989 capital. As the capital requirements increase toward the 811 2 standard shown in column (5), the increase in failures to meet the standards is relatively uniform, except for the largest size class. Nearly all of the largest banks would have failed by the 6/10 standard. The most interesting result is how many of the small and even moderate-sized banks had sufficient capital to pass the 8/12 standard. Given that capital standards have never been near that range, it is surprising that more than half of the banks in each size class up to $500 million would have passed this high standard. One reason for this result is that many of these smaller banks held capital in excess of the old standards and had relatively low risk-weighted assets, since they had little or no off-balance sheet activities. Finally, we note that the $83 billion aggregate capital deficiency for the 8/12 standards is substantial, 32, percent of 1989 capital. Most of this deficiency is in the largest size 2 3
class, which had a shortfall of $52 billion, or 54 percent of its capital.
We next examine the effects of what may be considered to be the four key innovations of the new RBC standards: 1) giving unequal weights to different asset categories, 2) including off-balance sheet activities in risk-weighted assets, 3) increasing the total amount of capital required, and 4) changing the treatment of loan loss reserves in the capital categories.
We examine the influences of these innovations by "undoing" them one at a time, leaving all other aspects of the RBC standards unchanged. The top of Table 8 Tier 2) and were not restricted to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets. Note that for rows (1) and (2), where specific weights are changed, the weights are adjusted so that the required capital for the banking system as a whole remains unchanged. Thus, in row (I), the common capital weight applied to all assets is such that total systemwide assets require the same capital in 1989 as under RBC. In row (2), when off~balance sheet items are weighted at zero, the weights on all on-balance sheet assets are adjusted upward proportionately so that systemwide required capital is held constant.
The results in row (1) indicate that weighting the on-balance sheet assets equally instead of applying the RBC relative risk weights has little effect on the number of banks that would have failed the standards, increasing the total from 591 to 597. However, there is a decrease in
23.
The effects of increasing the leverage requirement from 3 to 6 percent were also calculated. A 6 percent leverage requirement would more than double the 1989 failures to meet the new standards, to 1,639 banks representing 56 percent of assets, including 37 of the 47 banks in the largest siw class. This suggests that a high leverage requirement may have a dominating effect, even while tbe 3 percent requirement had virtually no effect.
the number of the largest banks that would have failed (from 20 to 15), because these banks have relatively high proportions of their on-balance sheet assets in the 100 percent category.
The effect of excluding off-balance sheet activities from the standards (row 2) would have increased the total number failing the standards from 591 to 915, while decreasing large bank failures from 20 to 12. This occurs primarily because off-balance sheet requirements shift a sigmficant part of the total capital burden (held constant in the calculation) from the great number of smaller banks onto the relatively few large banks that dominate off-balance sheet markets.
The increase in total quantity of capital required under the new standards (row 3) is also important--only 48 1 banks would have failed the new standards had the aggregate required Table 8 examines the effects of some hypothetical changes in bank portfolios made as a result of RBC in order to determine how successfd such changes may be in meeting the standards without actually raising any capital. Row (5) shows the effect on compliance with the RBC standards of eliminating 10 percent of the assets in the 100 percent category. Banks could accomplish this by selling off loans or other assets in the 100 percent category, by substituting some lower risk category assets for higher risk category assets, or by making adjustments to some assets (e.g., securing more loans with 1-4 family residences).
Row (6) shows the effect of eliminating half of all loan commitments with maturities of more than one year and half of all standbys issued to nonfinancial fm. These off-balance sheet changes approximate the effects of shifting half of all long-term commitments and all standbys backing commercial paper to commitments of one year or less (which have a zero weight). Row (7) combines these on-and off-balance sheet changes. The results suggest that quite a few banks may be able to meet the RBC standards in large part or in full by making on-balance sheet portfolio changes, but that the potential for meeting the standards by offbalance sheet adjustments is more limited, except for the largest banks.
VI. Conclusion
This paper uses historical data on the relationship between bank performance and portfolio behavior to analyze the new risk-based capital program. We test the RBC relative risk weights by regressing several measures of bank performance, including bankruptcy, on the proportions of bank portfolios in each of the risk categories one year prior, using data from 1982 to 1989. The data strongly suggest that the'relative risk weights constitute an irnprovement over the old capital standards of equal weights for all assets. In all cases, banks with higher ratios of risk-weighted assets to unweighted assets have poorer predicted performance, and most of these results are statistically significant. However, we also find several instances in which the risk weights for specific categories appear to be out of line with the performance results. An implication of these findings is that a risk-based deposit insurance scheme that uses the same portfolio risk-weights as the new RBC program (plus some rewards for higher amounts of capital) would likely constitute an improvement over the current flat-rate deposit insurance scheme, although there may be room for even further improvement by altering some of the risk weights and possibly including measures of bank performance.
Similar tests of the informational value of different capital standards suggest that both the new and old capital standards have independent information in predicting future bank performance problems, but that the new standards have more information. The data also indicate that there may be independent information in each of the Tier 1 and total capital components of the new standards. The leverage requirement as it is applied here adds virtually no new information, since almost every bank that fails it also fails one of the other RBC requirements. The degree to which banks fail the new standards is found to be a good predictor of future performance problems, lending support to **prompt resolution" policies to take action against banks based on the degree to which the standards are violated. Su'prisingly, the degree to which banks exceed the standards is not found to predict better future performance.
Examination of the stringency 'of the new RBC standards shows that they fall much more heavily on large banks than do the old standards, with the banks that fail the new standards representing more than one-fourth of all banking industry assets. This occurs because large banks have higher proportions of their portfolios in highly capitalized items, particularly off-balance sheet activities. The RBC standards are also more stringent than the old standards in absolute terms, with more banks failing the new standards, and failing them with a much larger capital deficiency. Nonetheless, the new standards still require only a small increase in capital relative to the current stock. Of the major innovations of RBC, only the more conservative treatment of loan loss reserves as capital and the overall increase in capital required raised the aggregate stringency of the standards significantly. Calculations of portfolio reactions to RBC suggest that many banks may be able to meet the new standards in part or in full by adjusting their asset holdings, but that there is limited scope for using offbalance sheet adjustments to meet the standards. Cash items i n t h e process of c o l l e c t i o n U.S. and OECD interbank deposits and guaranteed claims Some non-OECD bank and government deposits and s e c u r i t i e s General obligation municipal bonds Some mortgage-backed s e c u r i t i e s Claims c o l l a t e r a l i z e d by t h e U.S. Treasury and some other government s e c u r i t i e s Category A3 (50 percent weight) Loans f u l l y secured by f i r s t l i e n s on 1-4 family r e s i d e n t i a l properties Other (revenue) municipal bonds Category A4 (100 percent weight)
A l l other on-balance sheet a s s e t s not l i s t e d above, including: loans t o p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s and individuals, some claims on non-OECD governments and banks, r e a l a s s e t s , and investments i n subsidiaries Category 81 (off-balance sheet counterparty guarantees; weights i n parentheses) Direct-credit-substitute standby letters of c r e d i t (mainly 1 0 0 percent) Performance-related standby letters of c r e d i t (mainly 50 percent) Unused portion of loan commitments with o r i g i n a l maturity of more than one year (mainly 50 percent) Other loan commitments (0 percent) Commercial letters of c r e d i t (20 percent) Bankers acceptances conveyed (20 percent) Category B2 (off-balance sheet market r i s k contracts; weights i n parentheses) I n t e r e s t r a t e swaps, forward commitments t o purchase foreign exchange and other items (between 0 and 5 percent of t h e notional value, p l u s t h e mark-to-market value of t h e contract, capped a t 50 percent)
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
T i e r 1 Common equity, some preferred stock, minority i n t e r e s t i n consolidated s u b s i d i a r i e s less goodwill. T i e r 1 c a p i t a l must be a t l e a s t 4 percent of risk-weighted assets. Tier 2 Loan l o s s reserve (limited t o 1.25 percent of risk-weighted a s s e t s ) , subordinated debt (limited t o 50 percent of T i e r l ) , and other preferred and convertible stock. Tier 2 c a p i t a l cannot be l a r g e r than T i e r 1 c a p i t a l . T i e r 1 p l u s T i e r 2 c a p i t a l must b e a t l e a s t 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. Leverage Requirawmt T i e r 1 c a p i t a l must be a t l e a s t 3 percent of t o t a l on-balance sheet a s s e t s ( w i l l be higher f o r banks with poor examination r a t i n g s and f o r those not meeting c e r t a i n conditions, a f a c t not incorporated here; see t e x t , fn. 11).
Source: Federal Reserve press releases. 
Om
Dummy, equals one for f a i l i n g e i t h e r the primary or t h e t o t a l c a p i t a l portion of t h e old standard.
NEWONLY
Dummy, equals one f o r f a i l i n g any portion of t h e new standard and passing t h e old standard.
NEW CAPITAL STANDARD FAILURE -0NENTS
FAILTl
Dummy, equals one f o r f a i l i n g Tier 1 standard.
FAILTOT Dummy, equals one for f a i l i n g t o t a l standard.
FAILLEV Dummy, equals one for f a i l i n g leverage standard.
SHORTFALL Ratio of c a p i t a l s h o r t f a l l (maximum of c a p i t a l deficiency i n meeting leverage or t o t a l standards) t o adjusted assets. Zero i f t h e bank does not f a i l e i t h e r part of t h e standards.
EXCESS
Ratio of excess c a p i t a l (the minimum overage of t h e leverage and t o t a l standards) t o adjusted assets.
a. Total adjusted assets a r e t o t a l assets plus loan loss reserves.
b. A number of assumptions had t o be made t o construct h i s t o r i c a l l y consistent s e r i e s f o r these variables, since they do not correspond exactly t o Call Report categories. Details of these calculations a r e available from t h e authors.
c . For 1982, t h e only off-balance sheet item available was standby l e t t e r s of credit. For COUNTER, t h i s essentially means t h a t loan commitments (the only other substantial element of COUNTER) was missing for t h i s year. A zero was included f o r t h i s year for MKTRISK, which was zero for most of t h e banks and substantial f o r only a few.
Sources: Federal Reserve Reports of Condition and Income, FDIC press releases. Not shown, b u t a l s o included i n a l l of t h e s e r e g r e s s i o n s a r e a l l of t h e v a r i a b l e s shown i n Table 3 ( i n t e r c e p t , t i m e dummies, RWA20, RWA50, RWAl00, COUNTER, MKTRISK, REALEST, CLI, CONSUMER, and COMMIT) . F a i l T i e r 1, t o t a l , o r l e v e r a g e 6.0% F a i l T i e r 1 2.7% F a i l t o t a l , p a s s T i e r 1 3.2% F a i l only l e v e r a g e 0.1% Pass a l l p o r t i o n s 94.0%
Sources: F e d e r a l Reserve Reports of Condition and Income, FDIC p r e s s r e l e a s e s .
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm Number F a i l i n g C a p i t a l Standards/Total Number of Banks i n t h e Class P e r c e n t o f T o t a l Assets Held by Banks F a i l i n g t h e Standards T o t a l C a p i t a l Deficiency ($ m i l l i o n s )
A s s e t S i z e (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Class 4% T i e r 1 5% T i e r 1 6% T i e r 1 7% T i e r 1 8% T i e r 1 ($ m i l l i o n s ) 8% T o t a l 9% T o t a l 10% T o t a l 11% T o t a l 12% T o t a l (December 1989) Number F a i l i n g C a p i t a l Standards/Total Number of Banks i n t h e Class P e r c e n t o f T o t a l A s s e t s Held by Banks F a i l i n g t h e Standards T o t a l C a p i t a l Deficiency ( 4. Removal o f new t r e a t m e n t o f l o a n 416/12,623 l o s s r e s e r v e s i n c a p i t a l c a t e g o r i e s 16.5% $7,290 --
B. P o t e n t i a l P o r t f o l i o Reactions to R i s k -B a s e d C a p i t a l
5 . On-balance s h e e t adjustments (elim-437/12,623 i n a t i n g 10% of t h e 100 p e r c e n t r i s k 21.4% c a t e g o r y assets) $10, 606
6. Off -balance s h e e t adjustments (elim-544/12,623 i n a t i n g 50% of l o a n c o d t m e n t s and 22.4% 50% of standbys t o n o n f i n a n c i a l f i r m s ) $10,582
7. On-and off-balance s h e e t adjustments combined
Note: The 1992 risk-based c a p i t a l s t a n d a r d s a r e a p p l i e d t o December 1989 C a l l Report d a t a .
